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Summary
The time of reward and the temporal structure of reward
occurrence fundamentally influence behavioral reinforce-
ment and decision processes [1–11]. However, despite
knowledge about timing in sensory and motor systems
[12–17], we know little about temporal mechanisms of
neuronal reward processing. In this experiment, visual
stimuli predicted different instantaneous probabilities of
reward occurrence that resulted in specific temporal reward
structures. Licking behavior demonstrated that the animals
had developed expectations for the time of reward that
reflected the instantaneous reward probabilities. Neurons
in the amygdala, a major component of the brain’s reward
system [18–29], showed two types of reward signal, both
of which were sensitive to the expected time of reward. First,
the time courses of anticipatory activity preceding reward
delivery followed the specific instantaneous reward proba-
bilities and thus paralleled the temporal reward structures.
Second, the magnitudes of responses following reward
delivery covaried with the instantaneous reward probabili-
ties, reflecting the influence of temporal reward structures
at the moment of reward delivery. In being sensitive to
temporal reward structure, the reward signals of amygdala
neurons reflected the temporally specific expectations of
reward. The data demonstrate an active involvement of
amygdala neurons in timing processes that are crucial for
reward function.
Results and Discussion
Experimental Design
We studied the activity of single amygdala neurons in two
rhesus monkeys using a Pavlovian reward prediction task
superimposed on an ocular fixation task. We varied the instan-
taneous temporal reward probability, defined as the proba-
bility of reward occurring in the next time interval given that
task progression is in the current interval. The instantaneous
probability is the behaviorally relevant probability of obtaining
a reward in the next time interval and thus determines the
prediction of reward from moment to moment. The fact that
the Pavlovian task did not allow the animal control over reward
occurrence precluded confounds by operant behavioral
responses.
We varied instantaneous reward probability across four trial
types. In one trial type, a singular reward occurred at the end
of a specific 2.0 s visual stimulus (A; Figure 1A, top) with a
probability of 1.0. Thus, instantaneous reward probability*Correspondence: ws234@cam.ac.ukwas zero (0) at all times during the stimulus and p = 1.0 at its
end (Singular reward, Figure 1B, blue). In a second trial type,
a different visual stimulus (B; Figure 1A, middle) predicted
that reward would occur with an instantaneous probability of
0.025 in each interval of 50 ms during the entire stimulus dura-
tion of 2.0 s, but not in the absence of the stimulus. Thus, at any
50ms interval during the stimulus, the probability that a reward
would occur in the next 50 ms interval was 0.025. This proba-
bilistic schedule allowed no reward or multiple rewards to
occur during a single stimulus, which maintained the same
flat instantaneous reward probability with flat reward rate
during the entire stimulus duration (Figure 1B, red). In a third
trial type, another visual stimulus (C) served as control without
predicting any reward (Figure 1A, bottom). In a fourth trial type,
no stimulus appeared, and reward occurred with a flat instan-
taneous probability of 0.025 in each 50 ms interval throughout
5.0 s of the 6.0 s trial cycle.
Behavior
Both animals maintained key touch and central eye fixation
in >95% of all trials with stimuli A–C throughout neuronal
recordings. Error rates (erroneous key release) varied insig-
nificantly between the rewarded trials but were significantly
higher in the explicit no reward trial type (means of 8%–16%
versus 27%–36% errors; p < 0.0001, one-way ANOVA; p <
0.01 for any rewarded trial type versus no reward trial type,
Fisher’s PLSD test; n = 86, 25, and 15 trial blocks during
neuronal recordings of prereward and postreward activa-
tions). Anticipatory prestimulus licking was low (0 ms median
lick duration across trials, in all three trial types) (Figure 1C).
Careful adjustment of the licking spout with same distance
between spout and mouth of the head-fixed animal resulted
in similar licking in the two animals.
Stimulus A, which produced a singular reward at the fixed
time of 2.0 s after stimulus onset, elicited licking in two periods,
as observed before [30]. One peak occurred around 500 ms
after stimulus onset as behavioral response to the stimulus,
and a second peak occurred around 300 ms in anticipation
of the time of the reward (Figure 1C, top; median lick dura-
tion/2 s, 473 ms). By contrast, stimulus B, which produced
reward with flat instantaneous probability, elicited a lower,
more tonic rate of licking during stimulus presentation
compatible with the more spread-out reward occurrence
(Figure 1C, middle; rewarded trials excluded from analysis;
median lick duration/2 s, 395 ms). Very little licking occurred
in the explicit no reward trials with stimulus C (Figure 1C,
bottom; median lick duration/2 s, 0 ms).
Lick durations differed significantly between prestimulus
and stimulus periods (p < 0.0001; F(1,208) = 193; two-way
ANOVA) and among the three trial types (p < 0.0001; F(2,
208) = 94). Post hoc analysis identified longer licking durations
during both rewarded stimuli compared to the no reward stim-
ulus (both p < 0.0001, Fisher’s PLSD test). Although the two
rewarded stimuli elicited different temporal licking patterns,
the overall amount of licking during the entire periods of the
two stimuli differed insignificantly (p = 0.34).
These data demonstrate that the animals distinguished
between the different temporal structures of reward predic-
tions. Their licking followed the temporal profiles of reward
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Figure 1. Task, Behavior and Recording Sites
(A) Sequence of task events involving stimuli. Three pseudorandomly
alternating stimuli predicted a singular reward with a probability of 1.0 at
stimulus end (top), reward with a flat instantaneous reward probability of
0.025/50 ms interval during stimulus (middle), and no reward (bottom).
(A fourth trial type, not shown, involved a flat instantaneous reward proba-
bility of 0.025/50 ms during the trial but without any stimulus.)
(B) Measured instantaneous frequency of reward occurrence at stimulus
end (blue, n = 1,045 trials) or with flat instantaneous probability (p = 0.025/
50 ms) during stimulus (red, n = 646) (each vertical bar shows average
from four intervals of 50 ms). Note that multiple rewards could occur during
a single stimulus, thus producing flat moment-to-moment reward proba-
bility (analogous to ‘‘rate of occurrence of failure’’ for repairable systems
rather than ‘‘hazard rate’’). 0, stimulus onset.
(C) Licking behavior in the three trial types shown in (A). Horizontal lines
indicate photo beam interruptions by tongue at liquid spout. Each line
shows one trial; trial sequence is from top to bottom. In middle graph,
rewarded trials were excluded from analysis.
(D and E) Histological reconstruction of recording sites in animal A, with
approximate positions for animal B superimposed. (D) Location of neurons
with prereward activations (n = 86 neurons). (E) Location of neurons with
reward responses modulated by instantaneous reward probability. Trian-
gles indicate higher responses with higher instantaneous reward probability
(n = 36); squares show lower responses (n = 22). CE, central nucleus;
L, lateral nucleus; BL, basolateral nucleus.
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Figure 2. Modulation of Temporal Profiles of Neuronal Prereward Activity
by Different Instantaneous Reward Probabilities
(A) Single neuron. imp, impulse.
(B) Population density functions of averaged activity elicited by the three
stimuli predicting different instantaneous reward probabilities (blue,
singular reward; red, flat reward rate during stimulus, rewarded trials
excluded from analysis; black, no reward) (n = 86 neurons). Same bin width
(10 ms) and impulses/s calibration bar apply to (A) and (B).
(C) Distribution of neuronal p values from Fisher’s PLSD post hoc two-
sample comparisons following one-way ANOVA on prereward activations
between singular, flat rate, and no reward trials.
(D) Median activation strengths with different instantaneous reward proba-
bilities (695% confidence intervals).
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1840occurrence, which suggests temporally differentiated reward
expectations. The singular reward with stimulus A induced
an expectation at stimulus end, whereas the reward occurring
with flat instantaneous probability during stimulus B was
associated with longer and more tonic reward expectations.
Activity Preceding Reward
We tested 312 amygdala neurons in the two animals (204 and
108 neurons, respectively) with the singular reward delivered
at the end of the 2.0 s stimulus A. Of these, 86 (28%) showed
significant prereward activations during stimulus A (p < 0.05,
Wilcoxon test against prestimulus control period). We testedthe 86 neurons with the three stimuli (A–C) in pseudorandom
alternation but skipped the fourth trial type, which lacked
the required prestimulus control period. The 86 neurons
were located in the central nucleus (47 of 144 tested neurons),
basolateral nucleus (17 of 90 tested neurons), and lateral
nucleus (22 of 78 tested neurons) of amygdala (Figure 1D).
The activated neurons were insignificantly distributed among
these three amygdala nuclei (p > 0.05, chi-square test).
The prereward activations in all 86 amygdala neurons were
sensitive to reward timing. The activation of a typical neuron
preceding the singular reward at the end of stimulus A is
shown in Figure 2A (blue). It increased gradually after stimulus
onset and dropped immediately when the reward was deliv-
ered after the fixed 2.0 s period at stimulus end. The average
population activity shown in Figure 2B (blue) displayed
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1841a similar time course. The increase became significant against
baseline at a mean of 1,200 ms (654 ms SEM) after stimulus
onset. By contrast, with flat instantaneous reward probability
during stimulus B, activity increased earlier after stimulus
onset compared to singular reward (mean latency, 350 6
27ms; p < 0.0001; n = 86; t test) and exceeded early activations
with singular reward during 600–1,000 ms after stimulus onset
[p < 0.0001, F(2,255) = 25.03, one-way ANOVA; p < 0.005,
Fisher’s PLSD on flat rate versus singular reward]. Activity re-
mained tonically elevated during the remainder of the stimulus
period (Figures 2A and 2B, red). (Note that rewarded trials were
excluded from the main analysis and displays because of
occasional confounding responses to the reward themselves;
see below.) The activations failed to ramp up further during the
stimulus and did not reach a clear peak (Figures 2A and 2B),
despite the continuing increase in the sum of future reward.
This temporal profile occurred also in the few trials in which
the pseudorandom schedule produced several rewards. The
differences in time courses of neuronal activity between
singular reward and flat reward rate paralleled well the differ-
ences of the behavioral licking responses (compare Figures
2A and 2B with 1B, blue versus red).
Prereward activations were highest during the 400 ms
window immediately preceding stimulus offset and signifi-
cantly exceeded activations with flat instantaneous reward
probability in the neuron of Figure 2A [p < 0.0001, F(2,27) =
12.64, one-way ANOVA; p = 0.0172, Fisher’s PLSD on singular
versus flat rate reward], in all 86 neurons analyzed individually,
and in the population activity of the 86 neurons shown in Fig-
ure 2B [p < 0.0001, F(2,255) = 58.115, one-way ANOVA; p <
0.0001, Fisher’s PLSD on singular versus flat rate reward and
all other comparisons; Figure 2C]. During this 400 ms window,
a Spearman correlation coefficient of rho = 0.615 and a
comparison of activation strengths (Figure 2D) independently
confirmed the neuronal sensitivity to instantaneous reward
probability across explicit no reward, flat rate, and singular
reward trials. Amygdala neurons showed bursts of impulses
that increased toward the singular reward but were scattered
throughout the occurrence of flat rate reward (Figure 2A, top
and middle rasters). Defining bursts as greater than five
impulses/100 ms, the overall burst rate varied insignificantly
between singular and flat rate reward (means of 14.3 6 4.8
SEM and 13.8 6 3.9 bursts/ten trials, respectively; p > 0.5,
t test). Bursts ended significantly later with singular compared
to flat rate reward (472 6 24.1 and 850 6 47.3 ms before stim-
ulus offset, respectively; p < 0.0001), which is compatible with
the different temporal patterns of impulse rate with the two
instantaneous reward rates. All 86 neurons failed to change
activity during the no reward stimulus (p > 0.05, Wilcoxon
test; Figures 2A and 2B, black).
Taken together, instantaneous reward probability had
a remarkable influence on the temporal profiles of all prere-
ward activations of the tested amygdala neurons. Whereas
the neuronal activations preceding singular reward started
late and reached high peaks, the activations with flat instanta-
neous reward probability started earlier and maintained
a modest plateau until reward probability dropped with
stimulus offset. The absence of ramping with flat reward rate
during the stimulus suggested predictive coding of the instan-
taneous reward rate rather than coding of the increasing
sum of future reward. Thus, the different temporal profiles
reflected the different occurrences of predicted reward and
constituted a typical characteristic of instantaneous reward
expectation.Responses to Reward Delivery
Of the 312 amygdala neurons tested, 219 (70%) responded
significantly to the reward delivered at the end of the 2.0 s
stimulus (p < 0.05, Wilcoxon test against prereward control
period, with exceptions stated below). We tested 169 of these
neurons with all three rewarded trial types, and a subset of
them with all four trial types (see below). Responses in 58 of
the 169 neurons (34%) were sensitive to the instantaneous
reward probability at the time of reward.
Reward responses in 36 of the 169 neurons (21%) increased
with increasing instantaneous reward probability. The 36
responding neurons were insignificantly distributed among
the central, basolateral, and lateral amygdala nuclei (19, 8,
and 9 of 95, 33, and 41 tested neurons, respectively; p >
0.05, chi-square test; Figure 1E, triangles). The responses
were highest to the singular reward occurring after the fixed
delay (Figure 3A, blue), lower with flat reward rate during the
stimulus (red), lowest with flat reward rate during the trial
(dotted), and absent in explicit no reward trials. The graded
increases were seen in the neuron of Figure 3A [p < 0.0001,
F(3,29) = 27.24, one-way ANOVA; p = 0.0075 singular versus
flat rate during stimulus, p < 0.0301 flat rate during stimulus
versus flat rate during trial, p < 0.0001 singular versus flat
rate during trial; Fisher’s PLSD test] and in all 36 neurons
analyzed individually. The responses to flat rate reward during
the stimulus varied only insignificantly between reward deliv-
ered during the first and the second half of stimulus duration
(see Figure S1A available online; p > 0.1, t test). We tested
25 of these 36 neurons also in explicit no reward trials and
found similar significant differences in the population activity
of these neurons [Figure 3B; p < 0.0001, F(3,96) = 21.58, one-
way ANOVA; p < 0.09 singular versus flat rate during stimulus,
p < 0.001 flat rate during stimulus versus flat rate during trial,
p < 0.0001 singular versus flat rate during trial, Fisher’s PLSD
test; Figure 3C]. Similar relationships were found in an addi-
tional 12 of 23 neurons that showed reward responses in
addition to their prereward activations (the 23 neurons be-
longed to the group of 86 prereward neurons described above
and were tested with a prestimulus control period).
Taken together, activity in these 36 amygdala neurons was
positively modulated by instantaneous reward probability.
The more likely the reward was to occur at any given moment,
the higher was the neuronal response. Thus, the modulations
varied positively with the temporal predictability of reward.
The similarity of responses to flat rate reward during early
and late stimulus periods suggested dependence on the
predicted instantaneous reward rate rather than the predicted
increasing sum of future reward. The observation that
responses with flat reward rate without stimulus were lowest
among all rewarded trial types would suggest that the stimulus
had increased the predictability of the otherwise pseudoran-
domly timed reward. These activations might function to
maintain established, temporally specific reward predictions
after reinforcement learning. The positive relationship to
instantaneous reward probability resembles the attentional
modulation seen in monkey visual cortex V4, which parallels
the hazard function of stimulus change during individual trials
[12]. Our data demonstrate that such temporal modulations
are not restricted to attentional processes but occur also
with reward.
By contrast, reward responses in 22 of the 169 neurons
(13%) decreased with increasing instantaneous reward proba-
bility. The 22 neurons were located in the central, basolateral,
and lateral nuclei of amygdala (11, 5, and 6 of 95, 33, and 41
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Figure 3. Increases of Neuronal Reward Responses to Onset of First Reward with Increasing Instantaneous Reward Probability
(A) Single neuron.
(B) Averaged population responses (n = 25 neurons). Same bin width (10ms) and impulses/s calibration apply to (A) and (B). Color code in (A) and (B) same as
for Figures 2A and 2B; dotted line indicates flat reward rate during entire trial without stimulus.
(C) Distribution of p values from Fisher’s PLSD post hoc test following one-way ANOVA.
(D–F) The same as (A)–(C) but for decreases of neuronal reward responses with increasing instantaneous reward probability (n = 15 neurons).
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1842tested neurons, respectively; p > 0.05, chi-square test; Fig-
ure 1E, squares). The responses were absent in explicit no
reward trials, lowest to singular reward (Figure 3D, blue),
higher with flat reward rate during stimulus B (red), and highest
with flat reward rate during the trial (dotted). This relationship
was observed in the neuron of Figure 3D (p < 0.0001,
F(3,30) = 17.78, one-way ANOVA; p = 0.0463 singular versusflat rate during stimulus, p = 0.0121 flat rate during stimulus
versus flat rate during trial, p < 0.0001 singular versus flat
rate during trial, Fisher’s PLSD test) and in all 22 neurons
analyzed individually. The responses to flat rate reward during
the stimulus varied only insignificantly between rewards deliv-
ered during the first and the second half of stimulus duration
(Figure S1B; p > 0.4, t test). We tested 15 of the 22 neurons
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1843also in explicit no reward trials and found similar significant
differences in the average population activity of these neurons
[Figure 3E; p < 0.0001, F(3,56) = 18.005, one-way ANOVA; p <
0.02 singular versus flat rate during stimulus, p < 0.02 flat
rate during stimulus versus flat rate during trial, p < 0.0001
singular versus flat rate during trial, Fisher’s PLSD test;
Figure 3F]. The inverse relationship to instantaneous reward
probability contrasted clearly with the positive relationship
in the other neuronal group (Figure S2A). The responses in
the two neuronal groups differed without overlap (Figure S2B).
Taken together, these 22 amygdala neurons showed an
analogous but opposite instantaneous reward sensitivity to
the 36 neurons described above. The less likely the reward
was to occur at a given moment, the higher was the neuronal
response, suggesting a relationship to temporal reward
surprise. The similarity of responses to flat rate reward in the
two stimulus periods suggested dependence on instanta-
neous reward rate rather than summed future reward. Such
responses may reflect coding of positive temporal reward
prediction errors, as observed previously [31, 32]. Further
work may elucidate the nature and extent of time-sensitive
prediction error responses of amygdala neurons.
Conclusions
These data show that the temporal structure of reward occur-
rence influenced the activity of amygdala neurons. Although
there was no explicit requirement to monitor reward timing,
the animals’ behavior reflected well the experimentally
imposed instantaneous reward probabilities. The temporal
statistics of reward occurrence modulated two forms of
reward signal in different groups of amygdala neurons. Prere-
ward activity paralleled the behaviorally expressed reward
expectation. It ramped up to a singular reward at stimulus
end but stayed at a lower, tonic level with reward dispersed
over the whole stimulus period. These temporal profiles reveal
an internal anticipatory process rather than simple build up of
sensory responses over time and thus reflect a fundamental
characteristic of reward expectation. Responses following
the reward were enhanced when a reward was either more
likely or more surprising to occur. Both types of activity re-
flected predictability of instantaneous reward rate rather
than overall sum of future reward. These modulations suggest
that amygdala neurons have access to an internal clock that
processes the time of future reward occurrence. In being
sensitive to reward timing, amygdala neurons process a fun-
damental characteristic of reward function and thus may
play a more profound role in reward than hitherto known.
Neuronal reward signals sensitive to the expected time of
reward occurrence may be involved in a wide range of behav-
ioral functions, including allocation of behavioral resources
to specifically timed rewards, planning of sequential steps of
goal-directed acts, choices between temporally distinct
rewards, and assignment of credit to specifically timed reward
during novel reward learning, value updating, and economic
decision making, as conceptualized by animal learning and
economic decision theories.
Experimental Procedures
Animals and Behavioral Task
Two adult male Macaca mulatta monkeys (4.4 and 6.7 kg) used before [28]
served for the experiment. All procedures conformed to US National
Institutes of Health Guidelines and were approved by the Ethical Review
Committee of the University of Cambridge and the Home Office of the
United Kingdom. Each trial started when the animal contacted a touch-sensitive key. Three trial types used visual stimuli A–C and eye fixation. A
1.3 ocular fixation spot appeared after key touch at the center of a computer
monitor placed 450 mm in front of the animals. At 1,150 ms plus mean of
500ms (truncated exponential distribution) after fixation spot onset, a single
central 7 fractal visual stimulus appeared with the fixation spot superim-
posed (Figure 1A). An infrared optical system tracked eye position with
5 ms resolution (ISCAN). Stimulus and fixation spot extinguished together
at 2.0 s after stimulus onset. Key release or fixation break during fixation
spot presentation constituted an error and led to trial abortion and trial
repetition. Intertrial periods lasted 4.0 s (from stimulus offset to onset of
next stimulus). Thus, cycle timewas 6.0 s (stimulus plus intertrial). The fourth
trial type required key touch, did not use the fixation spot and specific
stimuli, and had the same cycle time of 6.0 s.
The instantaneous reward probability states the probability with which
a reward will be delivered in the next interval from the perspective of the
current interval (see Supplemental Information for details). With stimulus
A, a singular reward occurred with p = 1.0 at the fixed time of stimulus offset
(Figures 1A and 1B), resulting in increases of instantaneous reward pro-
bability toward stimulus end. With stimulus B, instantaneous reward prob-
ability immediately increased after stimulus onset and subsequently was
flat at p = 0.025/50 ms for the rest of the 2.0 s stimulus period. Stimulus
C was not followed by any reward. These three trial types alternated pseu-
dorandomly, sequences being limited to three consecutive same-trial types.
In a fourth trial type, reward occurred with a flat instantaneous probability of
0.025/50ms throughout 5.0 s of the 6.0 s trial cycle andwithout any stimulus
(reward delivery stopped during 1.0 s for data storage and preparation of
next trial, unannounced to the animal). To make this trial type detectable
in the absence of any stimuli, it was run in separate blocks from the other
three trial types. Because none, one, or several rewards could occur with
the flat probability schedules, reward occurrence corresponded to the
‘‘rate of occurrence of failure’’ for repairable systems in reliability engi-
neering [33]. An electromagnetic, computer-controlled liquid solenoid valve
delivered identical magnitudes of individual reward (Ribena juice) in all
rewarded trial types and emitted a noticeable, low-intensity click.
Data Acquisition and Analysis
We recorded the activity of single neurons with single moveable microelec-
trodes and standard electrophysiological techniques during task perfor-
mance while monitoring licking movements (see Supplemental Information
for details). We used the paired Wilcoxon test on neuronal activity in each
trial against control activity to assess onset and significance of prereward
activations and postreward responses. We subsequently determined the
influence of temporal reward structure on neuronal activity by comparing
the Wilcoxon-identified activations between the different trial types with
one-way ANOVA followed by Fisher’s post hoc test and, independently,
Spearman correlation (see Supplemental Information for details).
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes two figures, Supplemental Introduc-
tion, Supplemental Results, Supplemental Experimental Procedures, and
Supplemental Discussion and can be found with this article online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.07.062.
Acknowledgments
We thankMercedes Arroyo for expert histology and theWellcome Trust and
the Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute Cambridge for financial
support.
Received: May 3, 2012
Revised: July 6, 2012
Accepted: July 30, 2012
Published online: September 6, 2012
References
1. Church, R.M., and Deluty, M.Z. (1977). Bisection of temporal intervals.
J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 3, 216–228.
2. Gibbon, J. (1977). Scalar expectancy theory and Weber’s Law in animal
timing. Psychol. Rev. 84, 279–325.
3. Rakitin, B.C., Gibbon, J., Penney, T.B., Malapani, C., Hinton, S.C., and
Meck, W.H. (1998). Scalar expectancy theory and peak-interval timing
in humans. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 24, 15–33.
Current Biology Vol 22 No 19
18444. Gallistel, C.R., and Gibbon, J. (2000). Time, rate, and conditioning.
Psychol. Rev. 107, 289–344.
5. Sutton, R.S., and Barto, A.G. (1998). Reinforcement Learning
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
6. Mackintosh, N.J. (1974). The Psychology of Animal Learning (London:
Academic Press).
7. Wagner, A.R. (1981). SOP: A model of automatic memory processing in
animal behavior. In Information Processing in Animals: Memory
Mechanisms, N.E. Spear and R.R. Miller, eds. (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum),
pp. 5–47.
8. Dickinson, A., Hall, G., and Mackintosh, N.J. (1976). Surprise and the
attenuation of blocking. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 2,
313–322.
9. Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: a behavioral theory of impulsive-
ness and impulse control. Psychol. Bull. 82, 463–496.
10. Loewenstein, G., and Prelec, D. (1992). Anomalies in intertemporal
choice: evidence and an interpretation. Q. J. Econ. 107, 573–597.
11. Ho, M.Y., Mobini, S., Chiang, T.J., Bradshaw, C.M., and Szabadi, E.
(1999). Theory and method in the quantitative analysis of ‘‘impulsive
choice’’ behaviour: implications for psychopharmacology.
Psychopharmacology (Berl.) 146, 362–372.
12. Ghose, G.M., and Maunsell, J.H. (2002). Attentional modulation in visual
cortex depends on task timing. Nature 419, 616–620.
13. Brody, C.D., Herna´ndez, A., Zainos, A., and Romo, R. (2003). Timing and
neural encoding of somatosensory parametric working memory in
macaque prefrontal cortex. Cereb. Cortex 13, 1196–1207.
14. Leon, M.I., and Shadlen, M.N. (2003). Representation of time by neurons
in the posterior parietal cortex of the macaque. Neuron 38, 317–327.
15. Matell, M.S., Meck, W.H., and Nicolelis, M.A.L. (2003). Interval timing
and the encoding of signal duration by ensembles of cortical and striatal
neurons. Behav. Neurosci. 117, 760–773.
16. Roux, S., Coulmance, M., and Riehle, A. (2003). Context-related repre-
sentation of timing processes in monkey motor cortex. Eur. J.
Neurosci. 18, 1011–1016.
17. Janssen, P., and Shadlen, M.N. (2005). A representation of the hazard
rate of elapsed time in macaque area LIP. Nat. Neurosci. 8, 234–241.
18. Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Damasio, A.R., and Lee, G.P. (1999). Different
contributions of the human amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex to decision-making. J. Neurosci. 19, 5473–5481.
19. Hampton, A.N., Adolphs, R., Tyszka, M.J., and O’Doherty, J.P. (2007).
Contributions of the amygdala to reward expectancy and choice signals
in human prefrontal cortex. Neuron 55, 545–555.
20. Everitt, B.J., Morris, K.A., O’Brien, A., and Robbins, T.W. (1991). The ba-
solateral amygdala-ventral striatal system and conditioned place pref-
erence: further evidence of limbic-striatal interactions underlying
reward-related processes. Neuroscience 42, 1–18.
21. Gaffan, D., Murray, E.A., and Fabre-Thorpe, M. (1993). Interaction of the
amygdala with the frontal lobe in reward memory. Eur. J. Neurosci. 5,
968–975.
22. Baxter, M.G., Parker, A., Lindner, C.C.C., Izquierdo, A.D., and Murray,
E.A. (2000). Control of response selection by reinforcer value requires
interaction of amygdala and orbital prefrontal cortex. J. Neurosci. 20,
4311–4319.
23. Parkinson, J.A., Crofts, H.S., McGuigan, M., Tomic, D.L., Everitt, B.J.,
and Roberts, A.C. (2001). The role of the primate amygdala in condi-
tioned reinforcement. J. Neurosci. 21, 7770–7780.
24. Pratt, W.E., and Mizumori, S.J.Y. (1998). Characteristics of basolateral
amygdala neuronal firing on a spatial memory task involving differential
reward. Behav. Neurosci. 112, 554–570.
25. Schoenbaum,G., Chiba, A.A., andGallagher,M. (1999). Neural encoding
in orbitofrontal cortex and basolateral amygdala during olfactory
discrimination learning. J. Neurosci. 19, 1876–1884.
26. Sugase-Miyamoto, Y., and Richmond, B.J. (2005). Neuronal signals in
the monkey basolateral amygdala during reward schedules.
J. Neurosci. 25, 11071–11083.
27. Paton, J.J., Belova, M.A., Morrison, S.E., and Salzman, C.D. (2006). The
primate amygdala represents the positive and negative value of visual
stimuli during learning. Nature 439, 865–870.
28. Bermudez, M.A., and Schultz, W. (2010). Responses of amygdala
neurons to positive reward-predicting stimuli depend on background
reward (contingency) rather than stimulus-reward pairing (contiguity).
J. Neurophysiol. 103, 1158–1170.29. Carelli, R.M., Williams, J.G., and Hollander, J.A. (2003). Basolateral
amygdala neurons encode cocaine self-administration and cocaine-
associated cues. J. Neurosci. 23, 8204–8211.
30. Waelti, P., Dickinson, A., and Schultz, W. (2001). Dopamine responses
comply with basic assumptions of formal learning theory. Nature 412,
43–48.
31. Belova, M.A., Paton, J.J., Morrison, S.E., and Salzman, C.D. (2007).
Expectation modulates neural responses to pleasant and aversive
stimuli in primate amygdala. Neuron 55, 970–984.
32. Roesch, M.R., Calu, D.J., Esber, G.R., and Schoenbaum, G. (2010).
Neural correlates of variations in event processing during learning in ba-
solateral amygdala. J. Neurosci. 30, 2464–2471.
33. Luce, R.D. (1986). Response Times: Their Role in Inferring Elementary
Mental Organization (New York: Oxford Univ Press).
